Is there really no chance for peace with the Palestinians? Is it true that they don’t want to compromise? Two leading economists respond to an interview with Benny Morris.
Historian Benny Morris taught us a great deal about the history of the Israeli-Arab conflict, but above all he’s taught us that the official Israeli version is not always right. When the original documents are made public, after many years, a very different historical picture often emerges. We know this from his studies on the Palestinian refugees and on Israel’s border wars in the 1950s.
In one of the articles in his book “Tikun Ta’ut” (the Hebrew version of his “1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians”), Morris writes explicitly about Israel’s “old historians”: “These historians forgot a basic rule of historiography: that official documents are suspect and that an effort should always be made to get to the original. This is especially true in the case of an ideological national movement which is immersed in an existential conflict with its neighbors, and for which survival and victory, and not universal values of morality and justice (and certainly not historical accuracy), are the top priority.” (This quote is from an article in the Hebrew edition that does not appear in the English version of the book.)
Indeed, Morris followed this injunction until 2000. However, in his more recent publications he has completely discarded the rule which he himself laid down. Even though no official original documents exist about the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations – or about the discussions held by the cabinet and the army in the past decade and more – Morris has unhesitatingly adopted the official Israeli stance that “there is no partner for peace.”
He articulated this approach in a recent interview in Haaretz Magazine (“End of the Road,” Sept. 21), though he had already expressed it shortly after the failure of the talks. At that time he published a series of articles in The New York Review of Books together with a co-author by the name of Ehud Barak. Together they formulated the argument which has since then become the overarching myth in Israeli politics: the Palestinians, owing to their insistence on a settlement of their refugee problem, are unwilling to accept the two-state solution, and this is the reason for the failure of the peace negotiations. Historian Benny Morris lent his support to this contention without quoting even one document. The private conversations with Ehud Barak sufficed.
We too have no access as yet to the negotiations documents or the other documents of the period. However, over the years we have compiled information which casts a dark shadow over Benny Morris’ claims. This information comes from many sources, but the main one is our engagement with the economic side of the negotiations within the framework of the Aix Group. This group, which consists of Israeli, Palestinian and international experts, discusses and writes about the economics of a possible settlement between Israel and Palestine. The group’s work is not being done covertly. Our books are published on our website (www.aixgroup.org). Observers from the Israeli government and from the Palestinian side take part in our broad meetings.
Our work has made it possible for us to gain in-depth knowledge of the positions of the sides in the negotiations. To the best of our understanding a peace agreement is achievable. The main tenets of such an agreement are the establishment of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel, within borders close to the 1967 lines (with land swaps); the partition of Jerusalem into two capitals; a comprehensive solution of the refugee problem in which a small number of refugees would settle in Israel; and the end of the conflict. An agreement along these lines is possible and can be extended to all the Arab states on the basis of the proposal made by the Arab League, which has been lying at Israel’s doorstep for more than 10 years.
It is important to point out that the Aix Group has discussed the refugee issue extensively and has formulated a blueprint for a solution which can be accepted by both sides. Indeed, the two negotiating teams displayed great interest in this approach. We also know, from the books by Gilad Sher and Shlomo Ben-Ami, that the subject of the refugees was barely touched on in 2000. Therefore, in our assessment, it was not the refugee issue that caused the negotiations to fail, but in fact the disagreement over the borders.
Gilad Sher, who negotiated on behalf of Barak, wrote that at every stage of the talks, Barak made it clear that he did not intend to return to the 1967 boundaries. Yet this is the only possible border – with adjustments. Israel can make do with 78 percent of the historic Land of Israel, the Palestinians will not make do with less than 22 percent. That is all that remains to them.
As we understand it, Ehud Barak did not want to return to the 1967 boundaries, because in his opinion Israel is strong enough to demarcate its border unilaterally. However, Barak never expressed this view honestly, but tried to cast the blame on the Palestinians. He can be forgiven for claiming this, because he is a politician. Politicians have no commitment to the truth, either historical or contemporary. However, historians and people of science have a commitment to the truth. In fact, that is their only commitment. And Benny Morris, who since 2000 has been mobilized to defend the Israeli position in the negotiations, is being disingenuous with the truth. He adopted Barak’s stance without examining it factually and in the knowledge that there are testimonies that contradict it. This is regrettable: The important historian has become a committed propagandist.
Arie Arnon is a professor of economics at Ben-Gurion University in Be’er Sheva and a member of the steering committee of the Aix Group; Joseph Zeira is a professor of economics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a member of the AIX Group
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